By Lin Xi (Independent Chinese Scholar and Private Entrepreneur)
The living space of Hong Kong’s youth has long been a major political, social, and economic issue. By official Hong Kong standards (ages 12–39), the youth population numbers approximately 2.184 million, about 30% of the territory’s total population. The unemployment rate for young people (ages 15–29) currently sits in a range of roughly 6.8% to 11.2%, significantly higher than the overall societal rate. Affected by the broader economic environment and technological change, young people face multiple structural challenges in job-seeking and salary expectations. Since the implementation of the Hong Kong National Security Law on June 30, 2020, the living conditions of Hong Kong youth have deteriorated further.
Compared with youth in normal Western countries, Hong Kong youth face substantial differences in living and development space, mainly reflected in the following areas:
1. National Identity and the Identity Crisis Among Hong Kong Youth
National consciousness among Hong Kong youth presents complex and diverse characteristics. Influenced by historical education, colonial background, and globalization, some young people show ambiguous identity or a tendency for “localist consciousness” to outweigh national identity. According to a report by Deutsche Welle’s Chinese edition, the pro-Beijing New People’s Party released a “Youth National Identity” research report on April 10, 2018. The report stated that 95% of Hong Kong students had visited mainland China, 85% could read simplified Chinese characters, and nearly 70% used WeChat. However, on the question of identity, about 27% of students gave a “fifty-fifty” response to whether China could become a world power in the future. More than 30% of students believed that a Hong Kong identity and a Chinese identity were incompatible, and only just over 20% were willing to work or settle on the mainland.
Some scholars argue that the political culture and consciousness of Hong Kong residents are “over-saturated” in terms of local autonomy and international covenant perspectives, while remaining excessively weak at the level of national constitutional identity—leading to a crisis of civic consciousness and a state of psychological imbalance. The political identity characteristics of Hong Kong youth are closely tied to this unique residency status and crisis of national consciousness. According to a survey released on December 17, 2019 by the Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (formerly the University of Hong Kong’s Public Opinion Programme), 55% of respondents identified as “Hongkonger,” 11% as “Chinese,” 10% as “Hong Kong Chinese,” and 22% as “Chinese Hongkonger”—meaning 78% identified broadly as “Hongkonger” and 21% broadly as “Chinese.”
Survey data from 2019–2021 from the same institute show that those broadly identifying as “Hongkonger” consistently ranged between roughly 70% and 80%, while those broadly identifying as “Chinese” ranged between 20% and 30%. After the Umbrella Movement, localist sentiment intensified, as many residents—feeling their demands from that movement went unanswered—shifted toward localist ideals, believing only localist approaches could achieve “genuine universal suffrage” in Hong Kong, and consequently identified less as Chinese and more as Hongkonger. The protests against the extradition bill amendments pushed identification as “Hongkonger” to its highest level since the 1997 handover, with over 50% identifying solely as Hongkonger for the first time since such surveys began. Growing up in this broader social environment, the national consciousness and identity crisis of Hong Kong youth is expected to persist for a long time.
2. The Predicament of Stratified Social Mobility Facing Hong Kong Youth
Hong Kong youth face severe social stratification, with high housing costs and shrinking advancement opportunities leaving many young people feeling powerless and anxious about the future. Many highly educated young people still feel poor, even giving rise to the “slash” (gig-economy) phenomenon of rejecting traditional 9-to-5 employment. This predicament is reflected in several core dimensions: Hong Kong’s housing prices and rents are extremely high, making it difficult for young people to save enough for a down payment through wages alone. Lacking assets (such as property) means difficulty sharing in economic growth dividends, resulting in severe intergenerational wealth disparity. Middle-class youth face anxiety about class decline, worried they cannot maintain their parents’ standard of living, creating enormous survival pressure.
A telephone survey conducted by the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (CUHK) from May 6–20, 2025, examined public views on social mobility for Hong Kong youth. It found that 58.7% of respondents believed current opportunities for upward mobility among Hong Kong youth were insufficient, and 46.4% believed these opportunities would worsen over the next decade. Regarding whether young people would have better chances of success developing in mainland China or abroad compared to Hong Kong, 22.4% believed developing in mainland China offered better chances (down 5.3 percentage points from the previous year), 40.9% answered “fifty-fifty” (down 4.9 percentage points), and 31.1% believed it would not offer better chances (up 11.5 percentage points)—a statistically significant shift from the prior year. This predicament of stratified mobility facing Hong Kong youth is expected to persist for a long time.
3. The Employment Predicament of Hong Kong Youth
Hong Kong youth currently face a severe employment crisis, characterized by persistently high unemployment, stagnant wage growth, and a shrinking number of traditional entry-level positions. Lacking promotion ladders and upward mobility, young people commonly fall into a crisis of “credential devaluation,” “low pay and overwork,” and a sense of hopelessness often described as “lying flat” (tang ping).
The unemployment rate for Hong Kong youth (ages 15–29) is significantly higher than the overall rate, with the 15–19 age group hit hardest—graduation season being a particularly dangerous period of peak job-seeking and surging unemployment. With the spread of AI and automation, many traditional entry-level clerical and data-processing jobs that once allowed graduates to build experience have been replaced by technology. Employers increasingly demand “ready-to-deploy” talent, making it harder for young people to gain that crucial “first stepping stone” into the workforce.
In recent years, despite a substantial rise in overall educational attainment among young people, well-paying positions have not grown correspondingly. Some young people have been pushed into low-skill, low-wage, or non-standard contract work, meaning their actual income may be lower than that of older generations at the same age. Youth unemployment has long been far above the overall rate, and recent economic sluggishness combined with summer graduates entering the job market has worsened the situation. The latest figures from the Census and Statistics Department show that the unemployment rate for those aged 15–24 reached 11.9% from May–July 2025, a sharp rise of 2 percentage points from April–June—the highest since July–September 2022. Among the 15–19 age group, the rate reached 15.1%, also a near three-year high.
According to Legislative Council document CB(2)317/2023(01), Census and Statistics Department data show that Hong Kong’s population aged 15–24 was 602,700 (Q1 2021), of whom 145,700 lived below the poverty line during the same period—a youth poverty rate of 24.1%, the highest in years. According to the 2020 Hong Kong Poverty Situation Report, the number of impoverished youth (ages 18–29) had risen for five consecutive years, reaching a nearly 12-year high. The Legislative Council report concluded that current employment policy fails to adequately address insufficient local employment development for youth and grassroots workers, poor working conditions for young workers, and inadequate career ladders—instead focusing primarily on overall economic development and leaving young workers to fend for themselves in the labor market. This employment predicament for Hong Kong youth is expected to persist for a long time.
4. The Housing Predicament of Hong Kong Youth
At the core of Hong Kong youth’s housing predicament is the severe disconnect between high property prices and low incomes. Unable to afford expensive private housing, most young people are forced to live with their parents long-term, rent poorly maintained subdivided units (“sub-divided flats”), or fall into the “sandwich class” predicament—unable to afford private housing yet unable to obtain subsidized public housing—severely diminishing their willingness and ability to pursue personal development and start families.
Hong Kong is one of the most densely populated places in the world. Living space is severely constrained, with young people facing extremely high housing prices and rents, generally confined to cramped “sub-divided units” or micro-apartments. With public recreational and private leisure space extremely scarce, the physical living range of Hong Kong youth is often limited to shopping malls and areas along commuter rail lines, resulting in poor outdoor activity and living experiences.
In Western countries, due to vast territories or earlier urban planning, young people typically have access to larger detached houses or spacious apartments. Even in expensive Western metropolises like New York and London, per capita living space is significantly larger than in Hong Kong. Additionally, natural environments and public green spaces are readily accessible around Western cities, offering a more diverse and open lifestyle.
According to a report by Lam Sowai in HK01, titled (in translation) “Who Will Catch the Falling Youth Generation?”, Hong Kong’s predicament stems from stagnant social mobility. According to surveys by international public policy advisory organizations over the years, Hong Kong’s ratio of private housing prices to median household income has long ranked among the highest of major global cities. Based on 2023 market data, the median starting salary for university graduates was about HK$18,000; yet renting a sub-divided unit or “nano flat” of under 200 square feet in Hong Kong Island or Kowloon urban areas often costs close to or over HK$10,000 per month. When a university-educated young person must spend the majority of their monthly salary just to secure an extremely cramped, sometimes windowless living space—barely able to maintain basic “dignity of life”—”lying flat” seems to become their most rational choice. The previous generation’s formula for success—”study hard, get a good job, buy a flat and start a family”—has become an almost unattainable luxury for today’s Hong Kong youth.
Hong Kong housing can be broadly divided into three categories: low-rent “public housing” for low-income groups, government-subsidized “Home Ownership Scheme” flats (eligibility tied to assets and income), and private housing. While Hong Kong’s public housing ratio reaches 30%—unmatched globally—ordinary people may still be unable to afford a flat even after not eating or drinking for twenty years. According to a 2021 report by the Housing Bureau, about 220,000 people in Hong Kong live in subdivided units, with a median per-capita living space of just 6.6 square meters. Young people now face a dilemma: ineligible for public housing, yet lacking the capital for private housing—becoming part of the “sandwich class” the moment they enter society. They receive none of the welfare benefits, yet form the city’s main labor force and primary taxpaying group. This housing predicament for Hong Kong youth is expected to persist for a long time.
The identity crisis and national consciousness predicament, the stratified-mobility predicament, the employment predicament, and the housing predicament described above all emerged and were discussed around the time of Hong Kong’s 1997 handover. However, it was after the Umbrella Movement and the Anti-Extradition Law Movement that Hong Kong youth strongly expressed these grievances—only for the National Security Law’s implementation to directly suppress the voices and channels through which young people could express their demands. This is expected to produce a generation of Hong Kong youth marked by suppression and disillusionment—an issue that the Hong Kong SAR government should not only examine during short-term policy consultations, but must address by integrating short-, medium-, and long-term policy approaches. “When Hong Kong’s youth thrive, Hong Kong thrives; when Hong Kong’s youth are strong, Hong Kong is strong!”
