By： Jianli Yang
At this year’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, Beijing delivered a message to Eurasia and the wider Global South: in an age of trade wars, sanctions, and fractured globalization, China intends to be the stable growth engine others can rely on. Xi Jinping arrived with a script tailored for the moment, promising new initiatives in energy, renewable technology, and digital infrastructure while presenting the SCO as a platform that can rival Western institutions. The backdrop was unmistakable: U.S. tariffs are escalating, Europe remains economically shaky, and much of the developing world is looking for alternatives.
For China, the SCO is no longer just a forum for regional security cooperation. It is becoming the cornerstone of Beijing’s effort to deepen economic ties across Central Asia, expand its export markets, and offset the pressures of U.S. containment. Xi pledged investments in green industry and digital technology, while vowing to elevate the voices of the Global South in global governance. His pitch combined two themes that resonate in the region: practical development and the promise of partnership without Western-style conditions. In short, China wants the SCO to look like the future of international order, not a relic of post-Cold War geopolitics.
Yet the summit also underscored the obstacles that China faces. Xi’s meeting with India highlighted the tension between aspiration and reality. New Delhi’s participation is essential if Beijing hopes to make the SCO a truly pan-Asian economic hub. But decades-old border disputes, strategic distrust, and India’s insistence on strategic autonomy make closer alignment elusive. Prime Minister Narendra Modi continues to cultivate ties with Washington and its Indo-Pacific partners, signaling that India will not be absorbed into Beijing’s orbit. For China, this means the SCO cannot yet function as a unified bloc; India remains both inside the tent and outside it, hedging between cooperation and competition.
The contrast with Russia was striking. Xi’s dialogue with Vladimir Putin emphasized the depth of their partnership, forged in shared opposition to Western dominance and a convergence of needs. For Moscow, increasingly isolated by sanctions, China is the indispensable buyer, investor, and financier. For Beijing, Russia is a vital partner in rerouting Eurasian trade corridors away from Europe and toward Asia. But this alliance is asymmetrical. Beijing offers support cautiously, careful not to expose itself to Western secondary sanctions. Competition also simmers under the surface—especially in Central Asia, where both countries vie for influence over energy resources and infrastructure. The summit reaffirmed their solidarity but left key economic frictions unresolved.
It was in Central Asia, however, where China’s ambitions were most evident. The region’s geography and resources make it the centerpiece of Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative, and the SCO provides a ready framework to advance it. Xi’s emphasis on renewables, digital connectivity, and infrastructure dovetails with Central Asia’s search for modernization beyond hydrocarbons. Beijing can provide the solar panels, batteries, and 5G networks; Central Asian governments can provide markets, minerals, and transit corridors. The promise of investment is seductive, but it comes with well-known concerns: debt dependence, opaque contracts, and overreliance on Chinese firms.
Still, the broader trajectory is clear. By anchoring its trade and investment agenda in the SCO, China is building a counterweight to Western-led globalization. Initiatives such as trading in local currencies not only protect member states from dollar volatility but also serve Beijing’s larger goal of elevating the renminbi as a global currency. Infrastructure—rail lines linking China to Europe, pipelines carrying oil and gas, digital networks binding capitals to Beijing—functions as both economic development and geopolitical glue. Once built, these connections reorder trade flows and dependencies in ways that last for decades.
The SCO, in Beijing’s telling, is not only a vehicle for economic growth but also a voice for the Global South. Xi’s rhetoric about fairness and inclusivity taps into a widespread frustration with Western institutions. Many SCO members and observers are eager to embrace an alternative narrative that promises development without lectures on governance or human rights. In that sense, the SCO embodies China’s larger strategy: to present itself as the champion of connectivity and prosperity at a time when the West appears consumed by internal divisions and protectionist instincts.
And yet, Beijing’s path is not without resistance. Central Asian states are careful not to become too dependent on Chinese loans or markets. They diversify by seeking ties with Turkey, Europe, and even the United States where possible. India’s independence limits the SCO’s cohesion, while Russia’s weakness makes it more a dependent partner than an equal one. The very diversity that gives the SCO breadth also hinders its ability to act as a disciplined bloc.
For Washington and its allies, the summit was a reminder that economic statecraft is now the frontline of geopolitical competition. The SCO’s projects are not abstract; they are railways, pipelines, and networks that will shift Eurasia’s center of gravity. If China succeeds, it will lock in decades of economic influence and secure trade routes that bypass Western-controlled chokepoints. Even if India remains a holdout, the gravitational pull of Chinese capital and markets is shaping the region’s choices. And as more countries in the Global South look for non-Western models of growth, Beijing’s narrative of partnership without strings may gain traction.
The SCO summit thus offered a snapshot of both ambition and constraint. China is working to offset U.S. tariffs by cultivating new markets and weaving a web of trade and infrastructure across Eurasia. It is using the SCO to amplify its leadership of the Global South while tightening ties with Russia and wooing Central Asia. At the same time, India’s independence, Russia’s vulnerabilities, and Central Asia’s balancing act all reveal the structural limits of Beijing’s power.
Still, the momentum is unmistakable. The SCO is becoming one of the central arenas where the shape of the new world order is contested—not just with armies or missiles, but with supply chains, power grids, and fiber-optic cables. Xi Jinping wants China to be Eurasia’s growth engine. Whether the rest of the region is ready to accept that role remains an open question. But the infrastructure is already being laid, and with it, a new map of global influence.
Dr. Jianli Yang
Research Fellow, Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University
Founder and President of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and author of For Us, The Living: A Journey to Shine the Light on Truth and It’s Time for a Values-Based “Economic NATO”.
